The rapid growth of Internet and digitized content has made video distribution easy. Hence the need for video data protection is on the rise. In this paper, we propose a secure and computationally feasible video encryption algorithm based on the method of Secret Sharing. In an MPEG video, the strength of the DC is distributed among the AC values based on Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme. The proposed algorithm guarantees security, speed and error tolerance with a small increase in video size.
INTRODUCTION
Increase in popularity of Internet has catalyzed the emergence of applications involving multimedia transfer. Many of these applications require the secure transfer of videos or images, like video-on-demand, pay-TV to name a few. The Internet in its current form, does not provide security for multimedia communication. Therefore, multimedia encryption is needed for the complete confidentiality. Classic encryption algorithms like DES (Data Encryption Standard), AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) etc., are computationally infeasible for video data. They take large amount of time for encrypting huge video data. To decrease the encryption time, some encryption algorithms used simple scrambling mechanisms [1] . Evidently they are insecure. Moreover, these algorithms typically neglected the data format of the videos, thus burdening compression phase of codec [2] .
Owing to the large size and real-time applications of video, two types of encryption algorithms are generally in vogue. One method is selective encryption. In this method, only parts of the video content are encrypted, thereby reducing the computational requirement (time). This method is suitable because the full content of the video is not critical. Another method is the light-weight encryption which trades off security for computational time.
Tang [1] proposed a scrambling-based video encryption algorithm which incorporated encryption in the compression phase. This work used a random permutation list to replace the zig-zag ordered DCT coefficients of a block to a 1 × 64 vector. Zeng and Lie [3] extended this permutation to a segment of macroblocks. In each segment, DCT coefficients of the same frequency are randomly shuffled within the same band. Chen, et al. [4] further modified this idea by extending the permutation range from a segment to a frame. In this method, DCT coefficients of each macroblock are divided into 64 groups according to their positions, and scrambled within each group. In addition, the authors permute the motion vectors of P and B frames. However, these scramble-only methods do not provide sufficient security [5] .
Qiao and Klara [2] proved that Tang's encryption suffers from the known-plaintext and ciphertext-only attack. They also proposed a new encryption algorithm called VEA (Video Encryption Algorithm). In this algorithm, a chunk of an I frame is divided into two halves. Both the halves are XORed and stored in one half. The other half is encrypted with a standard encryption algorithm -DES. This algorithm provides good security. It also employs fewer number of XOR operations than DES. However, it cannot be implemented in real-time for high resolution and high bitrate video sequences. Shi and Bhargava [6] proposed a light-weight encryption algorithm, in which a secret key randomly changes the sign bits of all the DCT coefficients of every I-frame in MPEG video. The authors further extended the algorithm by encrypting the sign bits of motion vectors of P and B frames. However, as with most of the light-weight algorithms known so far, the algorithm of [6] is also susceptible to known-plaintext and ciphertext-only attacks [5] .
Note that the selective encryption algorithms typically uses a heavy-weight encryption algorithms (eg. DES, AES etc.,). Consequently, time taken for the encryption using them is high making them unsuitable for real-time applications. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, most of the known light-weight algorithms are susceptible to knownplaintext and ciphertext-only attacks [5] . Therefore, there is a need for a new secure video encryption algorithm perhaps designed by combining these two classes, which retains their respective advantages, whilst minimizing the dis-advantages. Apparently a naive combination is worse compared to each one of them individually -if one wants to reduce the time, then one may opt for selective light-weight encryption, which degrades the security. If one attempts to improve security by the Shannon's principle of selective permute-then-encrypt, it increases the computational time.
In this paper, we propose a selective cum light-weight encryption algorithm which is fast enough for real-time applications, yet possessing practically acceptable levels of security. A key ingredient of our solution is a suitably adapted and randomized version of Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme [7] . Further more, our algorithm, unlike most of the video encryption algorithms, has an inbuilt error-tolerance, which could be handy in many practical applications.
ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM

Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme
In this subsection, we briefly describe the concept of Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS). A (k, n) threshold-based secret sharing describes how a secret is shared among n participants [7] . It
where the value d 0 is the secret, d 1 . . . d k−1 are random numbers and p is a prime number. The secret shares are the pair of values (x i , y i ) where
is destroyed after each shareholder possesses a pair of values (x i , y i ) so that no single shareholder knows the secret value d 0 . In fact, no group of k − 1 or fewer secret shares can discover the secret d 0 . On the other hand, when k or more secret shares are available, then we may form at least k linear equations y i = f (x i ) for the unknown d i 's. The unique solution to these equations shows that the secret value d 0 can be obtained from the Lagrange's interpolation [7] . The SSS is regarded as a perfect secret sharing (PSS) scheme since knowledge of any (k − 1) values does not reveal any information about the secret.
Proposed Encryption Algorithm
Discrete Cosine Tranform (DCT) is popularly used to compress images and videos. It decomposes an image signal into multiple frequency components. The transform coefficients can be classified into two groups namely, DC and AC coefficients. The DC coefficient is the mean value of the image block and carries most of the energy in the image block. The AC coefficients (ACs) carry energy depending on the amount of detail in the image block. In practice, most of the energy is compacted in the DC coefficient and a few AC coefficients. In [8, 9] , the authors claim that encryption of 3 to 9 ACs is sufficient to hide the details of a given macroblock.
Our algorithm is a selective and light-weight encryption algorithm. It takes the DC component of each DCT block and depending on the number of ACs in that block distributes the DC among the ACs and itself, based on the method of secret sharing. We use Shamir's (k, n) secret sharing scheme, where n = k + 1. The value of k varies from 4 to 12 depending on the number of ACs in that block. Though we can share the DC among all the ACs available, it has the drawback of increase in video size as well as the decryption time at the receiver. We observed that decryption time is acceptable for real-time video applications when k lies between 4 to 12. Though the algorithm can have any value of k between 4 to 12, in this work we apply algorithm only for k = 4,8,12.
Algorithm 2 Secret Sharing
Step 1: Two values r 1 and r 2 are taken from randomly generated number list
Step 2: A (k − 1) degree polynomial is constructed as follows:
where p=3,7,11.
Algorithms 1 and 2 describe the video encryption procedure. In Algorithm 1, the count of non-zero ACs is stored as nac. Then the secret sharing method is applied based on the number of ACs in the block. If the number of ACs is less than 5, we simply XOR the DC and ACs of that particular block by a randomly generated number list. If nac lies between 5 and 10, (4, 5) secret sharing is applied. Other wise (8, 9) or (12, 13) secret sharing is applied when nac value is less than 20 and greater than 20, respectively.
The last AC coefficient, AC nac is used to store an extra coefficient. In around 95% of the cases the last AC coefficient is one. Even if it is not so, loss of this value would not cause any substantial change in the video quality to the end-user. Algorithm 2 explains how secret sharing is used to distribute the DC among itself and the ACs. A Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) is used to generate a list of random numbers. The PRNG takes a key (seed) as the input and produces a list of random numbers within GF (251) (Galois Field). Every time two values are taken from this list, denoted as r 1 and r 2 . These act as keys to that particular block.
For a given (k, n) secret-sharing, a (k − 1) degree polynomial is constructed as mentioned in the algorithm. f (r 1 ) becomes DCs share and f (r 2 ) becomes AC 1 's share. The shares of the remaining ACs are calculated based on their respective positions as AC p = f (p).
During decryption at the receiver end, the authorized user first has to generate a set of random numbers using the key (seed) as the input to PRNG and then proceed with constructing k equations from n values then use Legrange's interpolation to get back the DC and AC coefficients of each block [7] . Even if receiver loses n − k values (only one value in the current setting), he can retrieve all the DCT coefficients correctly. An unauthorized user cannot get back the secret because of the property that any k − 1 shares doesn't reveal anything about the secret.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section addresses the key features of the proposed algorithm i.e., security of the proposed encryption technique and the process of achieving error tolernace.
Security Analysis
For multimedia data, an encryption algorithm is said to provide acceptable level of security if the cost of breaking the proposed method of encryption requires more investment than buying the key. An encryption algorithm is secure, if it can withstand ciphertext-only and known-plaintext attacks.
In the ciphertext-only attack, the attacker has to find the original values from the encrypted values. According to our algorithm, for a given block the computational cost of breaking would be 251 2 because for each block we used 2 numbers from the PRNG. Now for a given video frame with q blocks, the computational cost of breaking the ciphertext by an unauthorized user would be 251 2q (generally q=1000). This makes it practically infeasible. Thus, our algorithm is robust to ciphertext-only attack.
In the known-plaintext attack, unauthorized user has both original and the corresponding encrypted values. Since we use a freshly generated seed (key) for each new transfer of the video, it is obvious that our algorithm is secure against known-plaintext attack. The key is transmitted within the MPEG video bitstream in encrypted form using the publickey of the receiver.
Error Tolerance
Secret Sharing is the key factor that helps in providing errortolerance. In the proposed algorithm, k values are distributed among k + 1 values. So, loss or change of one value can be tolerated. This feature of the algorithm comes with extra computational overhead which is also tolerable. If a value is lost, rest of the k values can be used to get back the original coefficients according to secret sharing. If a value is modified, the original values can be obtained by trial-and-error in at most k − 1 iterations. Hence error-tolerance is achieved.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed encryption algorithm is tested using a library named DALI [10] , which supports MPEG-1 and MPEG-2 videos. While distributing the DC among the ACs and itself, the proposed encryption is applied considering the DCT coefficients of each and every block as positive.
A series of experiments are conducted to judge the kvalue of secret sharing. We found that as the number of ACs is increased, the distribution of DC among more elements provides better security than simple distribution of DC among a fixed number of ACs. We experimented with distribution of DC among the ACs with k value fixed and k value varying depending on number of ACs. In both the cases, k is allowed to vary from 4 to 20. The results show that an optimal solution with acceptable computational overhead to the adversary and less decryption time for an authorized receiver occurs when k is allowed to be 4,8 or 12. Though the algorithm provides good security for any varying k, in this work we consider k= 4,8,12 only.
The algorithm is applied for multiple videos with different contents and motion characteristics. Figure 1 shows various kinds of videos along with their frame numbers. Figure  2 shows the corresponding encrypted video frames. The resultant video can be played by any MPEG decoder. Though motion in the video can be easily identified when the video is played back, it is very difficult to recognize the moving objects.
Sometimes the I-blocks in P and B frames cause partial leakage of the image information. In order to achieve higher security, I-blocks of P and B frames need to be encrypted. However, such an encryption increases encryption time intolerably. In order to decrease this overhead in time, motion vectors of P and B frames can be encrypted as substitutes to I-blocks, without loss in security level. But for real-time applications, encryption of motion vectors is not required because this partial leakage of image information helps a nonpaid customer by creating interest to purchase the video. This algorithm cannot be applied to highly sensitive videos where every part of the video is important. In order to apply this method in that domain, minor modifications are needed, i.e., the algorithm proposed in [11] should be augmented to this algorithm for the encryption of motion vectors. Table 1 shows the result of our technique on various videos along with the percentage increase in their video size. Figure 3 shows a graph comparing our algorithm with techniques of complete XOR, scrambling with XOR and scrambling of the DCT coefficients [4] . The average increase in video size by our method is 30.23% and the average encryption time taken per frame is 7.83ms only. Though scrambling methods cause less increase in video size and less encryption time, they are insecure. It can be inferred that, AEGIS and algorithm proposed by Qiao [2] incur similar overhead in size as complete XOR because these algorithms use the same principle as XOR and the time taken for encryption is very high than our method. 
CONCLUSION
We proposed a novel selective and light-weight encryption algorithm for the security of video data, based on the method of sharing the DC coefficients among the ACs and DC. Security analysis and experimental results show that the proposed encryption scheme is fast, provides good security with errortolerance and adds very less overhead on the compression of the video which most of the real-time video applications require.
